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With the rapid development of knowledge economy, enterprise innovation capacity 
has increasingly become an indispensible element for enterprises to get core competence. 
The improvement of enterprise innovation capacity depends on sustainable investment in 
innovation, but the attitudes of shareholders and managers on innovation investment are 
totally different. Generally speaking, innovation investment has the characteristics of 
large-scale investment, long investment cycle and high investment risk. For shareholders, 
they can avoid the risk of innovation investment by diversification according to the 
portfolio theory. Since increasing in enterprise innovation capacity can provide promotion 
for the core competence and long-term development of the enterprise, shareholders are 
willing to increase the innovation investment. However managers are not willing to 
increase the innovation investment because that the characteristics of innovation 
investment could have negative effects on the short-term performance of the enterprise. 
This will lead to a bad influence on the benefits of managers. Equity incentive is an 
effective way to weaken this difference between shareholders and managers. Executive 
equity incentives could balance the benefits between shareholders and managers and 
ensure interests of the shareholders and managers become more consistent by giving 
managers a certain stock of the enterprise. Managers could pay more attention on the 
enterprise innovation investment that can lead to a promotion for the core competence and 
long-term development of the enterprise. Different ultimate property rights and industry 
categories can lead to different relationship between executive equity incentives and 
enterprise innovation investment. We also need to consider the high ownership 
concentration of China’s listed companies when discussing the effect of executive equity 
incentives on enterprise innovation investment. 
This paper discusses the correlation between executive equity incentives and 
enterprise innovation investment and further analyzes the impact by different ultimate 
property rights, industry categories and control rights of large shareholders for the need to 
improve the enterprise innovation capacity of China. This paper tests the hypothesis with 
data of 1849 Chinese listed companies from 2009 to 2014. Empiric results show that: 
executive equity incentive is significantly positive correlated with enterprise innovation 
investment. This positive correlation is stronger in stated-owned enterprise compared to 
non-stated-owned enterprise, and the positive correlation is stronger in high-tech 















between control rights of large shareholders and executive equity incentives. The 
coefficient of the interaction between the control rights of large shareholders and the 
executive equity incentives is significantly negative. This conflict could weaken the 
positive effect of executive equity incentives on enterprise innovation investment. 
This paper enlarges the research on the correlation between equity incentives and 
enterprise innovation investment. It also provides new empirical evidence about this 
relationship. The research provides a reference for the government to improve the equity 
incentive system. It also provides theoretical foundation for China’s listed companies to 
establish an effective equity incentive plan according to their own circumstance. 
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